Is it legal? A Question of Culture - Deputy Governor Ed Sibley
14 November 2017
Speech
Speaking at the Eversheds
Sutherland Conference - "Leadership and
Culture Change in Financial Services"
Introduction1
Good
morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am delighted to be here this morning to speak
at this well-timed and highly relevant event.
There
has been much discussion on culture in Irish financial services in recent
months, particularly, but not exclusively, with reference to the Irish retail
banks.
I
spoke at an event recently2 during which I highlighted the breakdown in public trust and confidence in banking,
and the need for meaningful cultural change to repair and restore trust. I
will expand further on this issue today as it extends beyond banking, and will
also cover the work of the Central Bank with regard to behaviour and culture
and the connected topic of diversity.
The importance of
culture
Culture
is a somewhat nebulous concept, and much more difficult to define and measure
than profitability, pricing, compliance with regulatory requirements, such as
minimum capital requirements, liquidity coverage ratios, and so on. But, that does not make it any less important
- as the saying goes, it eats strategy
for breakfast3.
The Financial
Stability Board defines culture as an "institution’s
norms, attitudes and behaviours related to risk awareness, risk taking and risk
management, or the institution’s risk culture."4 Or to put in another way, an organisation's culture is formed by the
assumptions, values, expectations and beliefs, which drive behaviours of staff.
When we talk about culture, what we are really talking about is behaviour.
Culture
therefore drives the values and beliefs that govern how individuals treat
others, perform their tasks, take decisions, assess risk, and perhaps most
importantly, do the right thing to ensure they operate in a safe and sound
manner. It is the foundation upon which effective governance is built and is
critical to firms’ long-term prosperity. Importantly, experience5
shows that behaviour has a predictive value with respect to firms’ future
stability.
It is
clear, therefore, that regulated firms’ behaviours and cultures are within the
purview of regulators, both from a prudential and a conduct perspective6.
While
culture may be somewhat nebulous, the impacts of cultural problems are not. The list of scandals affecting both the
treatment of customers and the financial strength of firms is long and
inglorious. These are not limited to
financial services, as we can see from politics, and the entertainment,
telecoms, airline industries and so on, but pension misselling, payment
protection insurance misselling, LIBOR rigging, ‘rogue’ trading, and so on, and
most recently tracker mortgages have had a corrosive effect on trust in
financial services. As has, obviously, the catalogue of failures that led to
the financial crisis, the effects of which are still very much with us today.
It is
clear that there were multiple failures and multiple individual and collective
decisions leading up to the financial crisis, for example, collective
groupthink, business model and strategy failures, governance and control
issues, financial misconduct, excessive optimism, regulatory failures,
political interference and so on. There
are behavioural and cultural linkages across all of these failures.
The
behaviours and underlying cultures within financial services firms were wholly inappropriate. Short termism was incentivised, particularly
with respect to shareholder returns.
Effective internal challenge of the prevailing views was not.
Decisions
were made in the short-term interest of the shareholder (or at least
management’s interpretation of it), and whether decisions were legal, with too
little consideration of whether they were ethical or in the interests of the
customer. Ironically, this behaviour has
been massively destructive for long-term shareholder value, as well as
customers, and financial stability.
Unfortunately,
as the tracker mortgage scandal has amply demonstrated, this ‘is it legal?’ attitude still pervades in
too many institutions. On this specific
point, the Central Bank is under no illusion that continued and concerted
pressure is required to ensure all affected customers receive redress and
compensation and banks comply with our findings. I expect all the main banks will be subject
to Central Bank enforcement investigations. As part of these investigations,
interviews with relevant individuals have been and will be conducted, and large
volumes of documentation have been and will continue to be gathered and
reviewed.
Moreover,
I expect the boards, the individuals on the boards and the executives to be
accountable and to be held to account for not only the initial decisions which
started the consumer detriment, but the persistent and ongoing behaviours and decisions
that magnified this harm over an extended period. As well as answering to the Central Bank, I
would expect them collectively and individually to be taking a long hard look
in the mirror, and as pre-approved control function holders to be actively
considering their responsibilities regarding disclosure and whistleblowing.
In
more general terms, as the reputation of financial services firms has been
damaged there is a tendency for a greater degree of commoditisation of
services, products and product providers.
If consumers do not trust providers or their products, they are
understandably going to be more driven by price, when other factors may also be
important in terms of suitability. Concerns
are so deep rooted that there is a lack of trust regarding pricing (e.g. car
insurance, mortgage pricing), and customer treatment (e.g. re mortgage and SME
borrowers in distress).
In
this context, it is unsurprising that the Central Bank, together with other
international supervisory bodies, including, inter alia: the Bank of International Settlements, the European Central
Bank; the Group of 20; the New York Federal Reserve and the Bank of England7 have identified culture as an important issue.
What does good
look like?
While
regulators have strengthened the structural requirements around governance
risk, including remuneration rules, these rules are only a partial solution and
are not sufficient to drive appropriate culture in firms, which is the
responsibility of the board and senior management.
In its
paper on Banking Conduct and Culture: A Call for Sustained and Comprehensive
Reform, the G30 outlined that “Banks should specify their cultural aspirations
through a robust set of principles, and fashion mechanisms that deliver high
standards of values and associated conduct consistent with the firm’s purpose
and broader role in society"8.
While focused on banks, this paper resonates and is relevant across other
financial services sectors.
Although
there is no one action that will ensure that a good culture is achieved, there
are clear actions that can be taken to seek to ensure a firm’s culture is
improved and in line with that espoused by the board. These include:
1. The board taking responsibility for
the culture of the firm and understanding the behaviours that culture drives –
for example through the establishment of an ethics subcommittee to the Board;
or a measurement or monitoring by the board of the firm’s culture through
engagement with management, employee surveys or employee focus groups.
2. The board overseeing (e.g. through an
ethics subcommittee):
- recruitment
policy,
- hiring
decisions,
- implementation
of remuneration policies that reward and incentivise appropriate behaviours in
line with the desired culture; and
- reviews
of board effectiveness, committee structures and staff performance review
processes.
3. The board overseeing product
development and usage, including considering how behavioural economics and
marketing are being used, to ensure that customer interests are at the heart of
the process – i.e. products are truly in the customers’ best interests, and not
taking advantage of, for example, short term benefits with longer term costs.
4. As I will come to, the board actively
promoting diversity and inclusion at all levels of the firm to improve
decision-making.
5. Requiring Internal Audit to include a
culture audit in the annual audit plan. This might include the extent to which
culture is cascaded by the articulation of expected behaviours.
6. Ensuring all three lines of defence
have a responsibility for driving culture at a business line level rather than
enterprise level so that culture is truly embedded in the institution’s risk
management framework.
7. Ensuring incentivisation (in its
broadest sense, i.e. not just financial) is fundamentally linked to appropriate
behaviours; for example, ensuring promotion, recognition, and the variable
compensation element of remuneration is consistent with the behaviours expected
of employees to ensure the culture of the firm is reinforced.
8. Driving consistent communication of
the desired culture from the Board, recognising the importance of ‘tone from
the top’, to all staff levels of an institution.
9. Actively celebrating, incentivising
(e.g. recognising and promoting), those who come forward to identify issues and
behaviours that are not in line with or at least risk factors regarding the
espoused values and desired culture of the firm.
And all of the above to be informed by questions
that not only relate to whether the actions are legal, or in compliance with
regulatory requirements (important as they are), but rather questions such as:
- Is this sustainable?
- Is it in the long-term interests of our customers?
- Does this fit with our espoused values?
- Is this right?
- How are my staff incentivised to act? and
- How
does my organisation treat people that raise problems, issues and concerns?
Diversity
There
is strong evidence that diversity and inclusion has a role to play in improving
culture.
Groupthink has been
identified as a contributing factor to the financial crisis. There is strong
research to show that diversity at senior levels of regulated entities can help
to reduce the likelihood of groupthink,9 improve
decision-making,10
increase the level of challenge,11
and improve risk management.12
There are
also increasing numbers of studies that show that diversity is a competitive
differentiator; specifically, that when companies embrace gender and ethnic
diversity at the leadership level, they are more likely to be successful - or
to put it another way, they are less likely to fail.
Correlation and causation are sometimes difficult to determine, but the
correlation between greater diversity and business performance is certainly
clear.
McKinsey’s13 research in this area suggests that companies in the top quartile for gender or
racial and ethnic diversity are more likely to have financial returns above
their national industry medians. Companies in the bottom quartile in these
dimensions are statistically less likely to achieve above-average returns.
In my own
experience, a lack of diversity at senior management and board level in
organisations is a leading indicator of elevated behaviour and culture risks –
again as evidenced in the tracker mortgage scandal.
In this context, it is
concerning that a significant imbalance in gender and other diversity aspects remains
at senior levels operating in most regulated firms in Ireland. Approximately
80% of the most senior and influential appointments in regulated firms in
Ireland between 2012 and 2016 were male.14 Comparisons
are almost certainly worse for any other measure of diversity. This is not a unique circumstance in Ireland. The Empowering
Productivity Report, sponsored by the UK Treasury and the Bank of England,
concluded that UK Financial Services had an average of 23% female
representation on boards, but only 14% on Executive Committees.15
This is not to suggest that diversity is all
about gender. Experiments from
behavioural science has shown the importance of personality types on our risk
taking behaviours. These findings suggest that having a board made up of more
optimistic individuals than pessimistic individuals is dangerous and should be
avoided.
The UK Financial Services Authority report16 into the collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland identified significant
overconfidence by board members prior to the financial crisis, and in
particular in relation to the acquisition of ABN AMRO. The Dutch Central Bank17
has also identified a tendency towards consensus and optimism in organisations.
Overconfidence and optimism can depend on our biological makeup.
Studies have shown (e.g. Mischel)18
that more depressed people, who have a low psychological immune system tend to
self-rate their performance in various tests quite accurately. Individuals with
higher psychological immune systems tend to rate themselves far higher than
their actual performance (i.e. they are overconfident).
The
cookie jar experiment19 asks people to estimate how many coins there are in a transparent cookie jar.
When people do this independently, the accuracy of the average judgement rises
with the number of estimates and is generally very close to the actual number
of coins. But if people hear or see each
other’s estimates, the mean can shift wildly up or down. This experiment has
been completed across many different groups by age, sex, culture and so on, all
giving the same result. The experiment highlights an important point; better
results are achieved through diversity and independent
opinion.
As I
have commented on in the past, we have reviewed a sample of diversity policies
in regulated firms, which many financial services firms are now required to
have (under the CRD, Solvency II and the Central Bank’s Corporate Governance
Codes). In the main, they are striking
for their lack of ambition. They should not just be about ticking the box from
a compliance perspective – again, that question of ‘is it legal’ arises. Much
more is needed to be done, and our supervisory efforts in this regard are going
to increase.
Regulatory
response
The
Central Bank continues to enhance its approach to behaviour and culture,
including learning from international best practice. Work has been undertaken in banks and
insurance firms from a prudential perspective, and in the consumer area we have
developed a framework for the assessment of culture in regulated entities. As has been well documented, this work will
be expedited across the retail banks over the coming months, and be rolled out
further after that.
A
variety of tools will be used to assess culture in regulated firms, including
how boards and senior management are delivering against the good practices
outlined earlier. These include
considering:
- key risk indicators and triggers, for
example; staff turnover, and risk appetite breaches;
- approach to staff incentivisation;
- staff training;
- onsite inspections;
- staff surveys;
- board and executive management
meetings observation;
- interviews across the organisation;
and
- product design, development and
monitoring (including how customers are incentivised).
This
is not with the aim of delivering the impossible and frankly undesirable
outcome of a standardised culture across all financial services firms, but of
assessing the extent to which regulated firms are delivering the cultures they
espouse and identifying improvements that reduce prudential and conduct
risks.
We
expect institutions to critically evaluate their culture, considering what type
of culture they want to develop, how staff are incentivised to behave, and to
be held to account as to whether the culture they want is the culture they have
and how would they know if it is not.
We
will also be stepping up our work from a diversity and inclusion perspective –
linked to our work on culture. It will
increasingly feature in our ongoing supervision and inspection work, supported
by analytics. We expect regulated firms
to meaningfully address diversity and inclusion in the boardroom, at the
executive level and the pipeline of talent needed to run the organisation in
the long-term.
Conclusion
I
will conclude here.
Restoration of trust in the financial services
system is necessary for the delivery of the Central Bank’s vision for financial
services as a whole – specifically, that it functions well, is well-managed and well-regulated and it
serves the needs of the economy and its customers over the long term. Rebuilding trust, undoubtedly is in all of
our interests.
In
this context, culture is a critically important topic. I am under no illusions
that creating the right culture within organisations can be difficult to
achieve. That does not mean that we should not try, and in the effort,
necessary improvements will be made.
These improvements will reduce the risks of further failures to add to
the litany of historic failures, and that when they do occur in the future,
they are identified and resolved more quickly.
When
planning this speech, I had hoped to spend more time on positive aspects of
culture, and to give positive examples of it working well in certain
firms. The aim of this would have been
to differentiate between the good and the bad, to avoid dis-incentivising
change, by suggesting that all firms are the same. I have chosen not to do this today, not
because there are no examples of good practice, but because I believe my limited
time was better focused on the need for change.
There
are real opportunities for leadership (across sectors, and by individual firms)
to turn the dial, to drive change, to differentiate positively, to show: that
the mistrust is no longer valid, that lessons have been learnt, that you have
demonstrably, definitively and permanently changed, and that the behaviours and
cultures by and within your firms and industries are in the long term interest
of both your customers and your shareholders.
This
opportunity for change is every bit as urgent as the technology, business model
and regulatory changes that are frequently focused on.
I am
still sceptical as to whether the cultures and values that firms espouse are,
in many cases, the ones that they really want and believe in, and will be sustained
at moments of real pressure. But, it is
my job to be sceptical. It is your
customers’ views that are more important, and it is the treatment of them, that
you are demonstrably putting them first, that is the true test. And only
through cultural change can you pass this test again and again, and in doing
so, restore trust in the system.
I
thank you for your attention.
1 With thanks to Claire Lanigan, Ciara Murphy, Claire Nevin and Enda Nolan for
their assistance in drafting
3 “Culture eats strategy for breakfast” was first articulated by Peter Druker.
5 Examples: Honohan Report 2010 ‘ ..risky borrowing and lending behaviours’; DIRT
inquiry 1986-1998 ‘misbehaviour by banks in facilitating tax evasion’; Tracker
mortgage review 2017.
9 Daily,
C.M., Dalton, D.R. and Cannella, A.A. (2003) Corporate governance: Decades of
dialogue and data. Academy of management review,
28(3), pp.371-382.; Maznevski, M. L. (1994)
Understanding our differences: Performance in decision-making
groups with diverse members. Human Relations, 47(5), pp.
531–552.; Robinson, G. and
Dechant, K. (1997) Building a business case for
diversity. Academy of Management Executive,
11, pp. 164–177.; Zelechowski, D. and
Bilimoria, D. (2004) Characteristics of women and men
corporate inside directors in the US. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 12(3), pp. 337–42.
10 Hoogendoorn,
S., Oosterbeek, H. and van Praag, M. (2013) The impact of gender diversity on
the performance of business teams: evidence from a field experiment. Management
Science, 59, pp. 1514–1528.
11 Terjesen, S., Sealy,
R. and Singh, V. (2009) Women directors on corporate
boards: A review and research agenda. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 17(3), pp. 320–337
17 DNB,
Supervision of Behaviour and Culture,
2015.
18 Mischel.W , The Marshmallow Test:
Why self-control is the engine of success. Little,Brown, and Company, 2014.
19 Kahneman, D. Thinking
Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.