Financial Regulation in a Time of Uncertainty - Gerry Cross, Director of Policy & Risk
28 April 2017
Speech
Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick
Thank
you to Professor Eoin Reeves for the introduction and the invitation to speak
at the Kemmy Business School this afternoon.
I know
that my topics this afternoon will be of interest to those involved in the KBS
MSc course in Financial Services. But I hope to cover matters also of interest
to the broader community. In the first part of my comments I will speak about
the role of financial regulation in supporting economic activity. In the second
part, I will discuss issues arising from Brexit.
One
thing is sure: we are living in uncertain times. We only have to take a look
back over the past 12 months to understand how much this is the case.
It is
clear that we live in a world that is rather more unknowable than we previously
assumed and that we face a future that is, both in its short and medium term
aspects, rather more unpredictable.
Against
this backdrop, I am grateful to have the opportunity to talk to you today about
the role of financial regulation in a time of uncertainty.
Financial
regulation is, of course, only one part of the picture in terms of the public
policy measures and instruments that have a significant role to play in such a
context. Economic policy – fiscal, structural, and monetary; social policy,
including its protective, supportive and distributive aspects; and
international and regional arrangements, to mention a few, are all key to
addressing the challenges that arise.
But
financial regulation also has an important role to play. It plays an important
positive role in the effective functioning of the economy. And I wish to say a
little bit about this this afternoon.
Objectives
of financial regulation
Under
Article 6A of the Central Bank Act 1942, the Bank has three objectives relevant
to financial regulation:
(a) The stability of the financial system
overall;
(b) The proper and effective regulation
of financial service providers and markets; and
(c) Ensuring that the best interests of
the consumers of financial services are protected.
We
also have a mandate to seek to achieve the efficient and effective operation of
payment and settlement systems. But this is not something I will elaborate on
further today.
Financial stability
A
central objective in the area of financial regulation is to maintain financial
stability. We seek to avoid systemic crises so that we do not experience
disruptions to the normal functioning of the economy because of failures in the
financial system.
One of
the mistakes that was made in the run-up to the financial crisis was to think
that if individual firms were properly regulated and supervised then the system
as a whole would also be resilient. This proved to be a textbook example of
wishful thinking leading to major error and enormous damage. So, post crisis,
as well as financial regulation generally being re-oriented so that it is
significantly informed by a systemic as opposed to simply a firm-by-firm
perspective, a whole array of systemically-focused developments have taken
place.
New
institutions have been developed – the Financial Stability Board; the European
Systemic Risk Board; and the national macroprudential authorities to mention a
few. We have had to reconceive our approach to data creation, collection and
utilisation. And we have had to develop a whole suite of new instruments. These
include additional requirements for systemically important financial firms,
capital buffers that operate countercyclically, and various powers of
intervention by macroprudential authorities.
In
Ireland, the Central Bank that has been vested with marcroprudential powers.
Falling within our powers is that for setting macroprudential requirements
relating to the property market.
As you
will be aware the Central Bank introduced measures on residential mortgage
lending in February 2015. These include an 80% loan-to-value limit (90% for
first time buyers) and a 3.5 times loan to income limit for primary dwelling
house loans. These are required to be complied with by banks for a specified
percentage of mortgage lending.1 The aim of these measures is to curb the risk of house price-credit spirals,
and increase the resilience of both banks and households in the event of a
downturn. It is worth noting that it is not the aim of the measures to limit
house price-increases per se; the focus is stability and resilience not prices
taken separately. The Central Bank carries out an annual evaluation of the
mortgage measures. As Governor Lane recently told the Joint Oireachtas
Committee on Finance, more frequent evaluations would be counter-productive2
Regulating a well-functioning financial system
After
financial stability, the 1942 Act talks about the proper and effective
regulation of financial firms and markets. What exactly is meant by this proper
and effective regulation? We must assume that it does not mean regulating so
tightly and conservatively that no firm ever fails and no investor ever suffers
losses. This would be relatively easy to do, but it would have the effect of
more or less shutting down risk taking in the economy, and therefore the
economy itself. Therefore, it must mean something like regulating financial
firms and markets effectively and well so that they can fulfil their role in
supporting an effectively functioning economy.
Whether
it be making loans, facilitating funding, providing instruments that allow
risks to be hedged, or helping individuals and businesses manage their
financial affairs, the essential role of financial services is to support the
activities of other actors in the economy. The role of financial regulation is
to provide the framework of rules, requirements, supervision and enforcement
that allow this function to be carried out to optimal effect. It requires a
system of measures which support safety and reliability, deliver rule-based
effectiveness and efficiency, and promote the confidence without which the
system will not work.
At the
same time if we accept that the goal is the optimal functioning of the system,
then the things to be careful about are not just those things which under-secure
but also those things which, by going too far, themselves inhibit the
good-working of the system. That is the essential challenge of financial
regulation. And that, put frankly, is why it is difficult.
Soundness
of individual firms
A key
aspect of financial regulation is to ensure that financial firms are sound – soundly
financed and soundly run. This is prudential regulation. It is why we have
capital requirements and liquidity requirements, why we require strong
governance and effective risk management, why we worry about and inspect for
sound business models and IT vulnerabilities. For bank regulation of course we
carry out our responsibilities now as part of the Single Supervisory Mechanism
led by the ECB. So called “significant banks” are directly supervised by the
SSM, with the supervision of “less significant banks” overseen by it.
We are
seeking to achieve two things here: the first is that taken both collectively
and individually financial firms do not pose a threat to the system. This does
not mean trying to make sure that such firms never fail. But rather that where
firms do fail, (a) that does not happen on an unduly frequent basis; (b) it
doesn’t happen in a way that the system as a whole comes under pressure, and
(c) it does not come at the expense of the public purse.
And
the second thing is related. We are seeking to ensure that customers, and
potential customers, of financial firms have the necessary confidence to do
business with those firms and participate in the system as a whole. If everyone
decides to keep their money in a safe, then the system as a whole, the economy,
fails to meet the needs of society. It is important that financial services
customers have a high degree of confidence in the soundness of the firms with
which they are dealing. This is of course also why we have depositor, investor
and policy-holder protection schemes.
Levels
of required capital have been increased dramatically since the crisis. Banks
are now required to hold common equity capital at levels that would not have
been imagined prior to the crisis. The ability of banks to absorb losses is
also being materially enhanced under the requirements of the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive.
As for
liquidity, the EU requirements for prudent liquidity management have also
significantly increased since the crisis. Now banks are required to hold
significant levels of liquid assets. They will soon also be required to comply
with stable funding requirements which will limit the risks of undue levels of
maturity transformation
And
capital and liquidity are just the headline items. Governance, risk management,
remuneration, all of these have been transformed by post-crisis regulation.
With all of this reform having taken place why do we continue to hear so much
about ongoing regulatory change – about “Basel IV’ for example; or “CRD 5”. In
fact, there is no Basel IV and there is no CRDV 5. What is happening is that
the final components of the post-crisis regulatory reforms are being put in
place – including a required leverage ratio and a binding Net Stable Funding
Ratio.
And in
Basel the important work to address undue variability in banks’ risk modules is
being finalised. The Central Bank is very supportive of these and other
finalising elements. While we do not have strong views in favour of output
floors for risk models, we think it is of great importance that Basel III is
now brought to finalisation and the necessary compromises made to get the deal
finalised without undue further delay.
Beyond
this, while it will of course be necessary to continue to assess the reforms
that have been introduced to ensure that they are working as they should, we do
not consider that major further changes should be envisaged at this stage
beyond what is already in train. In this context, I would note that current
European Commission proposals to limit the flexibility of supervisory responses
are in our view unhelpful and contrary to some of the key lessons of the
financial crisis.
Effective
functioning of the financial system
In a
market-based system of financial services provision, it is important that that
market functions well. This means that the pricing of instruments and risk must
be effective. The Markets in Financial Instruments Legislation (MiFIR/MiFID2)
that is currently being brought into force to replace the original MiFID
legislation is a good example of regulation in this context.
The
MiFID legislation seeks amongst other things both to put in place the rules
that ensure that price formation works effectively – in particular a strong set
of rules around the transparency that is required in relation to trading in
financial instruments; and it seeks to ensure that the opportunities for gains
to be made as a result of undue opacities and complexities are reduced to the
extent possible.
The
new, enhanced MiFID regime will be brought into force in Ireland and throughout
Europe on 3 January 2018. For a detailed discussion of the implementation of
this legislation in Ireland, I refer you to a speech last week by my colleague Michael
Hodson, Director of Asset Management Supervision at the Central Bank3.
Consumer protection
Governor
Lane recently spoke comprehensively about the role of the Central Bank in
consumer protection in a speech given at University College Cork4.
I do not
intend to reprise here what Governor Lane said there. But let me mention a
couple of aspects.
The
first is to note how all of our financial regulatory mandates – financial
stability, prudential and market functioning regulation, and consumer
protection – have as a core feature ensuring that the financial system works in
such a way that the interests of consumers are appropriately protected so that
they in turn have confidence in how the system operates and in the firms and
entities who make it up.
Governor
Lane also noted that in this area there are a number of bodies with different
roles to play. There is the Central Bank, with our responsibilities for seeking
to ensure that financial firms deal fairly with consumers. There is the
Competition and Consumer Protection Commission whose responsibility includes
the provision of personal financial information and education, including a web
helpline and comparison of financial products, and there is the Financial
Services Ombudsman who assesses complaints of individual consumers and can
direct redress where he finds against a firm.
All
three of these bodies have their distinctive roles in respect of consumer
protection. And we work cooperatively for the protection of consumers.
Here
again there is virtuous cycle to be achieved. For while consumer protection is
at the heart of financial regulation and is essential to its success, it is
also the case that a well-functioning financial system is essential to the
success of the economy and, in turn, to the financial well-being of our
citizens.
What
we seek to do in the area of consumer protection is to ensure fair treatment
for consumers in how financial firms conduct their business – the suitability
of products, the quality of advice, the clarity and effectiveness of
information provided. At the moment to take one example we have a significant
focus on culture within regulated firms where we are seeking improvements. For
example, we have been directing firms to look at and restructure where
necessary their incentive payments for sales staff.
Fintech
An
important emerging challenge for supervisory authorities is the extent of
innovation taking place through greater use of modern technology (fintech).
Technological development can have a very positive impact (new products, reduce
costs, increase competition, improve service delivery) but it also brings risks
and challenges.
Rapid
innovation represents a test for our regulatory approach: (a) when we authorise
a firm to enter the financial system, we need to strike the right balance
between ensuring the firm meets our expectations, while at the same time being
to open to new ideas and innovation; (b) for regulated firms, we need vigilance
about shifting business models and emerging risks – including ensuring that
prudential and consumer protection requirements are appropriate for new
business models; (c) resolution regimes need to be such that they enable the
financial system to absorb the failure of individual firms as others grow and
prosper; and (d) we are strengthening international cooperation arrangements
necessary to be able to effectively regulate in a digital environment that may
have little regard for national borders or jurisdictional reach.
Enforcement
A
credible threat of enforcement is crucial to ensuring effective regulatory and
supervisory outcomes. Our approach in this regard is clear: we rely on
high-quality rules and assertive supervision underpinned by a rigorous approach
to enforcement.
Since
the financial crisis, our enforcement and redress powers have been
significantly expanded and strengthened by legislation. During which time we
have concluded some 80 enforcement cases, half of which dealt with consumer
issues and imposed fines totalling over €46 million5. In
2016 alone, the Central Bank imposed fines of just over €12 million, the
largest figure for fines imposed by the Bank in a single year to date.
Europe
I have
spoken so far about the key areas of financial regulation as they are carried
out by the Central Bank. I have not made a great deal of mention of Europe in
all of this – though you will have noted of course that when I have spoken of
legislation – CRDIV, MiFID2, BRRD – it is of course European regulation
that I have been referring to. While not all of our financial regulation comes
from Europe, a great deal of it – I would say roughly 75% - does.
As
well as being very active participants in the work of the three European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), the Central Bank has also been, like other
Eurozone bank regulators, since 2014 a member of the Single Supervisory
Mechanism led by the ECB, with responsibility for the direct supervision of
Significant Banks and for oversight of how less significant banks are
supervised by national authorities.
As you
are all very much aware, the European system is now undergoing a significant
challenge with the forthcoming UK exit from the Union. This is something with
significant consequences for financial regulation. So let me take the time to
say some things about this now.
Brexit
As
part of the European Union, the UK like all other EU / EEA countries, currently
enjoys the full benefits of financial services passporting rights. This means
that UK financial firms are able to provide services anywhere in Europe without
having to be authorised in the local jurisdiction. Similarly, firms authorised
anywhere in the EU can do business in the UK without needing a UK license.
Given
the UK’s intention to leave the single market and to no longer be subject to
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, it seems likely that such
passporting will come to an end.
Now,
it is possible that other arrangements can be found that in one way or another
mimic the current situation and therefore allow financial services passporting
to be retained. This could be on a permanent basis or, possibly more likely, as
some kind of transitional arrangement. As it has not yet been identified what
such arrangements might look like, and because the negotiations are likely to
be so difficult and fraught, for now, most people are making the appropriate
assumption that for UK firms passporting is likely to end and there is a
materially high possibility of it doing so in April 2019, 2 years after the
triggering of Article 50.
So at
the Central Bank, we have seen over recent months a large number of enquiries
from UK headquartered financial groups and firms thinking about potentially
setting up a subsidiary entity – be it a bank, or an insurance firm, or an
investment firm, or a fund manager, or a payment entity, or an infrastructure
provider, or something else entirely – in order to maintain their presence in
the EU after Brexit and, crucially, the ability to passport throughout the
remaining 27 EU (30 EEA) countries.
At the
Central Bank, in line with our stated approach of being transparent, active and
engaged, we have had many discussions with such firms to explain to them how
the Central Bank approaches regulation and supervision and to discuss with them
their potential plans to deal with the significant challenge that Brexit
presents for them. It is worth mentioning, because people often ask us about
this, that we have engaged with the Department of Finance, the IDA and others
to ensure that the approach of the Central Bank to regulation and supervision
can be effectively communicated to interested parties. This of course requires
respect at all times for the mandate and role of the Central Bank which for
financial regulation is as described above and nothing else.
What
we are finding is that there are a range of matters that such firms are
weighing up in their decision-making. These include such matters as the
availability of commercial office space, the ease of access to housing for
their staff, the travel infrastructure, the educational offering, tax rates,
both corporate and personal, ease of access to their parent entity in the UK,
and of course the approach to regulation and supervision. I will say more about
the latter in a moment. A big factor for such firms is also the question of
timing. If they are planning for the worst (even if hoping for the best) they
realise that they will have to have at least the minimum necessary structures
in place and operating by the end of Q1 2019.
In
terms of what we are likely to see in Ireland, whether through the extension of
existing activities or through the presence of new ones, the IDA has said that
it expects Ireland to achieve a meaningful share of the business that is
re-located from the UK. This is consistent with what we are seeing in the
Central Bank. UK firms have a choice of many countries to potentially move
business to and a wide range of factors to weigh up. Decisions are in the
process of being made. At the Central Bank we expect to see a meaningful
increase in applications for authorisation or for extension of existing
business. We have already seen a number of these either come through or be
indicated as being intended. And of course this is a matter of important
interest here in Limerick, particularly in light of the Limerick 2030 Vision
with its important financial services aspect. But as I said, the
full picture will not be known for a little while yet.
The
degree of continued integration.
One
question that UK-based firms are thinking about, and which is also very much on
the mind of policy makers, is the extent to which the City of London will
remain an important component of the EU financial services landscape. Will it
continue to be closely integrated with the EU economy? Or will we see a move to
something like two parallel ecosystems? This matters, not only for the European
economy as a whole, but also for individual firms for whom the more closely
London remains integrated the less disruptive Brexit will be for them and for
their business and structures.
The
recent months have seen increased articulation of the extent to which the
European economy is currently supported by financial services activities
originating in London. One recent report suggests, for example, that 78% of
European FX trading and 74% of European interest rate derivatives trading, and
50% of European fund management activities (by assets) takes place in the UK.6
What
this might mean is that while the issue of financial services will still be the
focus of significant political bargaining as part of the overall Brexit /
future relations negotiations, it can be hoped that both sides have a lot to
gain from achieving as low as possible levels of disruption to the degree of integration
of UK and European financial services. It must be remembered that great
financial centres grow organically over a very long period and create highly
beneficial cluster effects; and that while such centres can fade and give way
to others (see recent speech at Chatham House by Deputy Governor Sharon
Donnery; 23 March 2017 centralbank.ie) and modern IT
potentially makes physical clustering a little less key than previously,
nonetheless the challenges in recreating the London effect, even in a dispersed
way, within the EU-27 would be significant.
So
from a regulatory perspective my hope would be that the political negotiations
on the financial services aspects would result in a situation whereby
disruption and change, while to some extent inevitable, would be kept to the
minimum possible. This could be achieved if negotiations were to focus on
requiring only those changes which are necessary (a) in order to ensure the
financial stability of both areas; and (b) to ensure that firms carrying on
business in the EU (or UK) do so on the basis of the same standards and
requirements that apply in the other area. The system cannot work if firms
located in one area are able to undercut firms in the other because the rules are
looser or substantially different.
These
two imperatives – financial stability and avoiding regulatory mismatch – are of
course in themselves very demanding. They will require a lot of work and effort
to achieve. Achieving them, at least at a reasonable cost to all concerned,
will require some imaginative thinking and the development of new approaches
and solutions. For example, we may need to develop a new concept of enhanced ‘equivalence’ or some similar concept,
new forms of third country oversight and supervision, agree on dispute
resolution, and further develop arrangements for binding cross-border
resolution agreements. Each of these in itself will be highly challenging. And
taken together even more so. And time is tight. So the best minds need to be
addressing themselves to these matters now. (The good news is that this is
underway.)
Transition
From a
financial regulator’s perspective, the other feature that we worry about is the
tightness of the potential timetable. Whether it be ensuring that there does
not take place a major disruption to flow of financial services through the
arteries and veins of Europe’s economy or simply ensuring that individual firms
have as much time as possible to make their appropriate arrangements, the
availability of a transitional period is highly desirable. It is recognised of
course that this is something for the political authorities as part of the
overall negotiations, but I welcome the recent indications that discussions
about the future relationship between the parties will take place on the basis
of appropriate progress in the “divorce” negotiations and therefore we
should not have to wait until the end of those negotiations for progress to be
made on this question.
The
role of the European authorities
For
the final part of my talk here today, and still very much in the context of
Brexit, I would like to say a few words about the European authorities in the
area of financial services and the very significant contribution that they can
make, and are making, to optimal outcomes in respect of Brexit as it relates to
financial services.
A
major risk, given the circumstances, is that regulatory differences could
emerge between different countries in the context of Brexit-related decision
making. This could have serious negative consequences. Take for example, the
so-called question of “substance”. This is the question as to how much presence a firm
needs to have in place in a EU jurisdiction in order to be allowed to be
authorised there. Can it just have a small group of administrators who are not
really on top of the business decisions that need to be made to run the entity
safely and well but who, for example, simply allow business to be booked into
the entity before being re-booked in the UK parent. Would that be acceptable?
And, if that is not sufficient, then what do we mean by substance? What
actually has to be in place for the entity to be authorised by a EU authority?
Why
does this matter? Well it matters in particular because, unless a firm is
actually running the authorised business from the EU jurisdiction where it is
authorised, then the business must be being run elsewhere. And if it is being
run elsewhere then in fact it is the rules and requirements of that other
place, and the supervision of those other authorities, that are governing the
business, not the EU rules and supervision. And that of course is one of the
things, as mentioned above, that we wish to avoid – that firms doing business
in the EU are not in fact subject to EU rules and requirements.
The
risk of divergence on this question has been a real one. This is why we have
been very pleased to see the SSM in the last couple of weeks come out with a
set of guidelines on the matter7.
We have been working very closely and very actively on this as part of the SSM.
And we are pleased to see that the guidelines that they have issued reflect in
many respects similar thinking to our own in terms of an appropriate balance of
robustness and pragmatism. We will continue to work closely with our colleagues
in the ECB and SSM as the situation and thinking evolves.
Amongst
the SSM guidance is the following:
- There needs to be appropriate substance. Establishing an
“empty shell” company will not be acceptable. Banks in the Euro area should be
capable of managing material risks potentially affecting them independently and
at the local level, and should have control over the balance sheet and all
exposures.
- While all the requirements for a well-functioning bank must
be in place from the start, to the extent that the European entity is building
up its activities over time, it may be possible that some of the additional
local capabilities and arrangements are also built up in parallel, to be
decided on a case by case basis, grounded on an appropriate and credible
business plan. We will of course want to see consistency between the
governance, management and controls and the business that is carried on.
- In respect of the approval of models already authorised by
the UK authorities, there will be a limited period when, subject to certain
requirements and any appropriate checks, such models may continue to be used by
the Euro area entity in advance of them being fully considered and approved by
the EU regulators.
- For back-to-back booking, there could be temporary
transitional arrangements on a case-by-case basis. Thereafter there needs to be
sufficient capabilities to manage material risks locally and after any
transitional period a part of all risks should be managed locally.
- In respect of outsourcing (or insourcing), there should be
robust risk control mechanisms in place so that outsouring arrangements are
properly monitored and fully compliant with regulatory requirements.
This guidance
will ensure the avoidance of supervisory divergences in respect of both
Significant and Less Significant Banks in the Euro area. While the SSM does not
have direct supervisory responsibility for the latter, it does have the final
say on the authorisation of any bank, significant or less significant.
In so
far as other types of financial firms are concerned - investment firms, asset
managers, insurance companies – of course the SSM’s guidance does not apply
directly to the approach to these firms. However, we would expect that the same
or similar standards will apply. And the good news, is that here too the
European authorities are closely engaged.
ESMA,
for example, is developing guidance which will set out the approach that it
would expect to see adopted by national authorities when dealing with
Brexit-related, and other, authorisation applications. EIOPA is likely to
follow a similar approach. Peer review and scrutiny of the authorisation
approaches of national authorities is also being undertaken by the European
Supervisory Authorities. This is also very welcome.
Finally,
it is worth mentioning that the role and functioning of the ESAs is itself the
subject of a consultation currently being undertaken by the European
Commission. While this is topic which can be the subject of a whole separate
speech, it is worth mentioning now for this reason. The departure of the UK
from the EU changes the landscape significantly. At the Central Bank we think
that this may be a good moment to look again at the ESAs’ role and capacity in
driving supervisory convergence and to consider whether these might be further
enhanced.
Conclusion
Let me
finish there.
You
will see from what I am saying that there is a great deal going on at the
moment. And all of it with significant relevance and importance to Ireland, its
economy, and its citizens.
During
all this change, one might take a mental solace in the constant presence of the
River Shannon, the great unifying focus point on this impressive 133-hectare
campus. But even there we have to bear in mind the words of Heraclitus: “No man
ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not
the same man.”
Amid
all this change, it is important that the Central Bank is open, transparent,
engaged, and responsive to ongoing developments . Hopefully my comments today
will contribute a little bit to this.
I look
forward to hearing your questions.
1 The requirement is that 5% of loans to first time buyers may exceed
the LTV limits, while 20% of the lending to second or subsequent buyers can
exceed the 80% limit. 20% of PDH lending may exceed the LTI limit. For a
detailed explanation of the Central Bank’s mortgage measures, see: here