Exploring the Steady-State Relationship between Credit and GDP for a Small Open Economy - The Case of Ireland

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Abstract

The rapid increase in credit in an economy is now commonly perceived to be one of the leading indicators of financial instability. This view has been reinforced by the aftermath of the international financial crisis, which commenced in mid-2007. A key policy response has been to focus on the ratio of private sector credit to GDP for an economy, observing, in particular, significant deviations between the actual and long-run trends of the ratio. This paper examines the issue of the steady-state relationship between private sector credit and GDP in the case of Ireland, a country which, even by international standards, experienced a sizeable expansion in credit over the past 10 years.

JEL classification: G01, E51, E63.
Keywords: Credit, GDP, Indicator.

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Non Technical Summary

A rapid increase in credit in an economy is now commonly perceived to be one of the leading indicators of financial instability. In the aftermath of the recent crisis, a key policy response has been to focus on the ratio of private sector credit (PSC) to GDP. In particular, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has proposed that banks hold additional capital at times when the ratio of private sector credit to GDP deviates from its long run trend. This paper examines the relationship between PSC and credit in the case of Ireland, a country which, even by international standards, experienced a rapid accumulation of credit in the years preceding the current crisis.

In examining the Basel proposal, this paper makes two contributions. First, instead of using deviations from a long run trend to indicate periods of excessive credit growth, the paper identifies a period when the relationship between credit and GDP was stable, thus allowing one to estimate the steady-state relationship. Estimating a capital buffer based on deviations from this steady state relationship, particularly for countries that have experienced a rapid build up of credit, may be a more accurate calibration of a countercyclical buffer. While Irish credit growth increased markedly over the past 10 years, it is worth noting that other European countries also experienced significant increases. Indeed the paper notes the emergence of a “twin club” development across Europe in that regard. Thus, we feel the notion of alternative states in the PSC to GDP ratio needs to be allowed for in applying the Basel proposal across countries.

Second, the paper develops a counterfactual scenario, in which PSC in the Irish economy grew at the European average rather than the rapid rate experienced prior to the crisis. Generally speaking, the build-up in credit prior to the crisis would imply that the banking sector must deleverage over the coming years, impacting negatively on economic growth. Our counterfactual scenario indicates that by 2007 GDP in the Irish economy was over 20 per cent higher than what would have prevailed if a more normal rate of credit growth had been experienced. However, the scenario also suggests that by 2010 GDP had fallen below the level suggested by a more equilibrium level of credit within the economy. Thus, going forward, these results would suggest two countervailing implications for Irish growth: while
the deleveraging process could cause a drag on economic growth as credit levels are set to contract in the real economy, the overcorrection implied by the counterfactual scenario suggests that growth rates could accelerate in the short to medium term.
1 Introduction

As a result of the established link between credit booms and financial crises, excessive credit growth is now generally considered a reliable ‘early warning indicator’. Traditionally, for most western countries, the amount of credit provision in an economy was directly related to the level of deposits within the financial system. However, over the past 10 to 15 years, financial innovation saw the link between credit and deposits broken with the consequent result of a general increase in credit provision. This sizeable build-up of credit has been identified by many as being one of the main contributing factors to the financial crisis, which originated in mid 2007. As a result, greater attention is now focussing on determining what the steady-state level of credit should be for an economy and benchmarking this against the actual levels which pertain at a point in time.

From a macro prudential perspective, the ratio of private-sector credit to GDP has become an increasingly popular benchmark of the sustainable levels of credit. Most recently, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)\(^1\) has issued a proposal to incorporate this approach into the regulatory system, by using the deviation from long-run trend of the PSC/GDP ratio (the ‘credit gap’) to calibrate a countercyclical capital buffer. In the first instance, this method uses the ratio of credit to GDP, thus allowing credit to grow naturally in line with overall economic activity. Trending techniques are then employed to generate a long-run mean for the ratio and the actual position is then contrasted with this mean.

In this paper we examine, in a rigorous manner, the nature of the credit to GDP relationship in an Irish case. Ireland, in many regards, represents the classic example of a country where a rapid and sustained accumulation of private sector credit resulted in deep financial instability. Since the mid-1990s, the Irish economy experienced profound economic change, having, in the 1980s, witnessed negligible economic growth, an average unemployment rate of 15 per cent and high levels of personal taxation. The emergence of the so-called Celtic Tiger in the mid-1990s led to a sustained period of economic growth. Between 1995 and 2007, the size of the economy doubled with the total number of people employed in the country increasing by approximately 64 per cent. This sustained increase in income levels

\(^1\text{See also, Drehmann et al (2010)}\)
was coupled with a stable, low interest rate environment. At the same time, a considerable degree of financial liberalisation was taking place in the Irish credit market. Almost inevitably, a housing boom occurred, which, in terms of price increases and relative activity levels, was probably the largest across OECD countries for the period 1995 - 2008. The sharp contraction in the Irish property sector post-2008 has also been amongst the most significant in the western world with ensuing difficulties for the Irish financial sector.

In examining the ratio of Irish credit to GDP, we determine the presence of a number of different states in the relationship between these variables over the period 1982 - 2010. Based on this analysis, we determine the steady-state relationship between credit and GDP in the Irish economy and then perform scenario analysis to see what would have happened to Irish GDP between 1998 and 2010, if credit had evolved in a manner similar to other European countries for that period.

In examining the Irish case, we think the results we obtain have a number of interesting policy implications. Firstly, they call into question the use of simple private sector credit to GDP ratios for countries who have experienced significant credit increases over the past 10 years. As we will see, while the Irish case may be somewhat extreme in terms of the growth of credit, it was by no means the exception in an European context. Indeed, it would appear that there has been an emergence of two clubs across European countries in terms of the growth rate of the PSC to GDP ratio. In modelling a relationship between credit and GDP, our results also suggest a somewhat uncertain path for future Irish GDP growth. Given the very high rate of the Irish funding gap at present, it is almost inevitable that a rather sustained period of deleveraging will be experienced by the Irish financial system. This will more than likely exercise a drag on the pace of Irish economic growth in the medium term.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows; in the next section the relationship of credit and GDP is discussed in a broad policy context. The role of financial liberalisation in an Irish context is then examined. In particular we focus on the residential property market. An empirical section examines the issue of a structural break in the Irish ratio and a subsequent section presents a model of credit and GDP with a counterfactual simulation. A final section offers some concluding comments.
2 Credit to GDP and the policy environment

2.1 The role of credit in crises

The incidence of high credit growth in advance of financial crises has been recognised for some time. Numerous case studies have pointed to the incidence of high credit growth before crises (see, for example, Kaminsky’s (1999) discussion of the Asian and Latin American crises in 1990s). In the empirical literature, there is significant evidence of a link between rapid credit growth increasing defaults. For instance, Dell’Ariccia and Marques (2006) predict that episodes of future defaults are more likely in the aftermath of periods of strong credit expansion. Segoviano Basurto et al (2006) show that credit to GDP is a good predictor of future defaults, while Clair (1992), Keeton (1999) and Salas and Saurina (2002) all link rapid credit growth with loan losses. Jimenez and Saurina (2006) find a direct, lagged relationship between credit cycles and credit risk.

Generally, this link between rapid credit growth and increasing defaults is linked to over-exuberant lending in the upswing of a cycle. During an upswing, the risk associated with loans may become underestimated. It has long been shown that there is an empirical link between GDP and credit growth. Additionally, there is evidence that banks’ lending mistakes are more prevalent in economic booms (when GDP is increasing) than in recessions.

There are a number of channels through which this link between rapid credit growth and increasing defaults may operate.

Asset prices play a key role in this. From a demand perspective, on the upswing of a business cycle, increasing asset prices increase the value of (property) collateral against which households and corporates can borrow. In addition, increases in other asset classes can increase the net worth of borrowers. From the supply-side point of view, taking a stylised balance sheet in which assets equal liabilities and equity, an increase in asset prices will push up the value of equity enabling a bank to expand the asset side of its balance sheet by increasing lending (see, for instance, Adrian and Shin (2008)). The role of securitisation is also important in this process. For instance, the ability to move assets off balance sheet in such a situation allows banks to continue to expand the asset side of their balance sheet without a concurrent increase in liabilities.
A number of potential channels through which lending standards may decline in an upswing have also been put forward.² For instance, the traditional principal-agent problem may apply to the relationship between bank managers and shareholders. As shareholders have imperfect information, once the bank manager attains a rate of return which satisfies the shareholders, he may pursue objectives (for instance a growth objective) other than those which maximise the firm’s value. Herd mentality (Rajan (1994)) relates to the requirement for managers to compete with others in the market. Credit mistakes are judged more leniently if they are common to the whole industry, while managers are likely to be punished by shareholders if they continually lose market share. As such, if competitors are pursuing market share objectives, it is in the interests of the individual bank manager to follow suit. The institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and Udell (2004)) posits that over-time banks weight less the experience of the last crisis. As crises generally happen irregularly, the longer the time period since the last crisis, the fewer staff there are who recall that experience. For staff that still remember the last crisis, there is the ‘this time it’s different’ problem. Finally, financial liberalisation, and the associated reduction in reserve requirements, and expansion of international flows of cheap money is another important means through which credit may expand.³

All the above factors may lead to a decline in the creditworthiness of borrowers which will increase the vulnerability of banks’ loan portfolios to a shock to asset quality. When such a shock occurs, depositors (traditionally retail, but more recently, wholesale depositors) must reassess their investment in the bank, leading to funding liquidity pressures, and ultimately, insolvency, for those banks that are affected.

### 2.2 Credit as an early warning indicator

As a result of the established link between credit booms and financial crisis, excessive credit growth is now generally considered a reliable ‘early warning indicator’. The issue in

²For a more detailed discussion of the literature, see Saurina and Jimenez (2006).
³Pill and Pradhan (1995) find that the ratio of private-sector credit to GDP best captures financial liberalisation, while Demirguc-Kunt and Detrgiache (1998) find limited evidence of the predictive power of this ratio of financial crises, when used as a proxy for financial liberalisation.)
calibrating an early warning indicator is identifying credit growth that is justifiable based on economic fundamentals, and credit growth that may be deemed ‘excessive’.

A number of different approaches have been taken to estimate this in the literature. Perhaps the most predominant method, in many respects, is the signalling approach, which is used in Kaminsky (1999), Borio and Lowe (2002), Hilbers et al (2005), Borio and Drehman (2009) and Alessi and Detken (2009). Most recently, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)\(^4\) has issued a proposal to hard wire this approach into the regulatory system, by using the deviation from long-run trend of the PSC/GDP ratio (the ‘credit gap’) to calibrate a countercyclical capital buffer. In the first instance, this method uses the ratio of credit to GDP, thus allowing credit to grow naturally in line with overall economic activity. The series is then de-trended using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, and a threshold level is then set, which weights in some way the relevant importance of type I (failing to give a signal when a crisis occurs) and type II errors (giving a positive signal when no crisis happens).\(^5\)

There are a number of drawbacks associated with the Hodrick-Prescott approach. First, the HP filter fits a trend through all the observations of real GDP, regardless of any structural breaks that may have occurred. Such structural breaks could easily occur in long-run data. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1998) among others, show that credit growth is stronger in developed economies than in less-developed economies. As such, many emerging economies can experience rapid increases in credit related to a ‘catch-up’ process as the economy becomes more financially sophisticated. Such increases could be appropriate and indeed necessary for the development of an economy, but could trigger a signal using the HP filter.

HP filters are also sensitive to end-point bias, as the trend line is fitted symmetrically through the data. If the beginning and the end of the data set do not reflect similar points in the cycle, then the trend will be biased upwards or downwards depending on the actual

\(^4\)See also, Drehmann et al (2010)

\(^5\)Probably the most popular method is to minimise the noise-to-signal ratio; however, other methods can be used: Borio and Drehman (2009) examine two alternative approaches: minimise the weighted sum of type I and type II errors given weights of alpha and one minus alpha for type I and type II errors, respectively; and minimise the noise-to-signal ratio subject to predicting some minimum percentage of crises.
path of the series for the earliest and latest observations (Giorno et al., 1995). This issue may be reduced using ARIMA forecasts. In addition, HP filters are also sensitive to a time length selection; results from rolling HP filters may differ significantly from ex-post trend estimation (see Gourichas et al.) Further, in the specific case of the PSC/GDP ratio, if GDP declines, but credit remains constant, a boom can be detected.

Finally, the outcome from a HP filter is sensitive to the smoothing parameter used. For instance, Borio and Lowe (2002) and Borio and Drehman (2009) use a lambda of 1600, the typical smoothing parameter for a business cycle. The BCBS use a smoothing parameter of 400,000, thus assuming that the credit cycle is 3-4 times the length of the business cycle. Figure 1 documents the gap between realised and trend for the Irish PSC/Credit ratio, with the trend estimated from a HP filter across a selection of lambda values. It is clearly evident that this change in smoothing parameters has a significant impact on the volatility of the detrended series. Drehman et al (2010) show these findings are repeated at the international level.

Other methods have also been used to estimate the equilibrium level of credit. While a number of models have examined the determinants of credit demand or credit supply separately, modelling and estimation techniques in this area are complicated by the difficulty of disentangling supply- and demand-side effects. Hofmann (2001) uses a cointegrating VAR model on an individual basis for 16 industrialised countries. The findings are interpreted as long-run extended credit-demand relationships, although some credit-supply effects may also be captured. An error correction model is used to analyse dynamic interactions by computing orthogonal impulse responses. Eller et al (2010) estimate the long-run (demand-side) and short-run (supply side) determinants of private sector credit developments, first identifying structural breaks in the data, then estimating a cointegrating VAR for a panel dataset, and then modelling short-run dynamics as an markov-switching error correction model allowing coefficients to vary in different unobservable states. Egert et al (2006) use an out-of-sample panel model to estimate the equilibrium level of credit in transition economies. Arguing that in-sample estimates are biased due to low initial levels of credit in what were once centralised economies, and because equation estimates for these economies are unstable, the authors use small open developed economies to benchmark equilibrium
credit in transition economies.

The growing literature on DSGE models also includes some estimation of equilibrium levels of credit. For instance, using Bayesian techniques, Gerali et al (2010) estimate a model in which impatient corporates and households demand loans supplied by imperfectly competitive banks using both deposits and capital (which is accumulated from reinvested earnings). Margins charged on loans depend on elasticities of loan and deposit demand, interest rate stickiness and banks’ capital-to-assets ratio. Banks’ balance sheet constraints establish a link with the business cycle, which affects profits and capital, and therefore the supply of credit.

3 Property prices and financial liberalisation - the case of Ireland

Since the early part of the present decade, the Irish economy and the property market, in particular, present classic examples of excessive credit growth. Rapid expansion in private sector credit went hand in hand with a surge in both house prices and activity levels. In this section we briefly outline some of the changes in credit provision in the Irish banking sector and the impact this has had on the residential mortgage market.

The significant increase in the availability of mortgage credit in an Irish context can be observed in Table 1. The total value of mortgages issued increased threefold between 2000 and 2005. The total number of new mortgages went from just under 50,000 in 1995, to 80,000 in 2000 and to over 120,000 mortgages by 2005. The average size of a mortgage also increased considerably over the period. In 1995 the average mortgage extended by an Irish credit institution was 54,094 euros, by 2005, this had climbed to 231,206 euros. Inevitably with such an expansion in credit, house prices increased substantially over the period. Between 2000 and 2007, prices rose by almost 65 per cent. The peak in house prices occurred in 2007 quarter two and since then the residential market has witnessed a substantial decline in activity as both housing supply and prices have fallen considerably.

This surge of increased credit availability came after a period of considerable financial deregulation and liberalisation in the Irish market. The mid to late 1980s and the 1990s saw
the ending of the formal guidelines on bank lending to the private sector and the indicative
guidelines on the sectoral allocation of credit by banks; the introduction of new interest-
rate arrangements in 1985; a major relaxation of exchange controls in 1988 with a further
relaxation in 1992. The primary liquidity ratio was also subject to liberalising measures
as it was reduced four times from a level of 10 per cent in 1991 to 2 per cent in 1999,
in conformity with the requirements of the new operational framework of the Eurosystem.
The removal of credit and interest-rate controls would have given banks more freedom in
determining the level and allocation of credit that they would like to supply. Furthermore,
the removal of exchange-rate controls would have increased banks’ ability to attract deposits
from non-residents.

Another seminal influence has been monetary union in Europe, which was quickly fol-
lowed by the full integration of the euro area money market. A further feature of the lib-
eralisation of the loan market was the cessation of Central Bank guidelines on the sectoral
allocation of credit. This is highly relevant in the context of residential lending patterns
as the Bank had consistently favoured the supply of credit to so-called productive enter-
prises and accordingly had discouraged its supply to the property market, which it had not
perceived as being productive.

Traditionally, credit institutions’ total domestic deposit liabilities has been the main
funding source for credit supply in the Irish market. However, an additional source of fund-
ing available over the past 10 years has been cross-border funding in the form of interbank
borrowing and debt issuance. Such a source of funding was negligible before the mid-1990s
but has grown exponentially since then. Both the timing of its emergence and its subse-
quent rate of growth would suggest that the funding rate has had a significant influence
on domestic economic activity and particularly that in the mortgage and housing markets.
This issue is commented on in more detail in Section 4 below. An exact chronology of
the control and subsequent liberalisation of the Irish credit market is discussed in detail in
Kelly and Everett (2004). See, in particular, Box 1 pgs 96 and 97, which illustrates the
building and dismantling of controls over the period 1973 to 1999. Although many of these
liberalising measures took place a long time ago, up to 20 years ago in some cases, their
full effects may have taken some time to fully materialise. The relationship between house
prices and greater availability of mortgage credit is examined in some detail in an Irish context by Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007). Using a variety of econometric techniques, they found a mutually reinforcing relationship between house prices and mortgage credit. In a related piece, Addison-Smyth, McQuinn and O’Reilly (2009) clearly demonstrate that the emergence and substantial increase in the ability of domestic banks to source funds from abroad had a significant impact on house prices post-2003.

4 Empirical examination

Our primary focus is on the relationship between GDP and private-sector credit (PSC) in the Irish economy over the period 1982 - 2010. In Table 2 a summary of the data for certain sub-periods is presented. In Figure 1 we plot the real annual growth rates of GDP and PSC over the period. What is evident is that for much of the sample, the growth rates would appear to be highly correlated suggesting the possibility of a long-run equilibrium relationship. However, for certain sub-periods it is apparent that any such relationship between the variables breaks down. From 1997 to 2001 and from 2003 to 2009 it is obvious that annual growth rates of PSC considerably exceeded that of GDP. This can be seen from Figure 2, which plots the ratio of PSC to GDP i.e., financial deepening. While the ratio is relatively stable between 1982 and 1997, thereafter, the growth rate would appear to experience two sharp increases. Particularly, from 2003 onwards, this period of PSC growth was funded primarily through cross-border funding in the form of interbank borrowing and debt issuance. Traditionally, in the Irish economy, a relatively stable relationship existed between PSC and retail deposits. However, the extent to which this relationship broke down can be gleaned from Figure 3. This plots both the actual level of credit and deposits in the left panel and the percentage difference (or funding gap) on the right. The scale of this funding gap suggests that in the absence of a significant increase in future deposit levels, the Irish banking system is facing into a period of considerable deleveraging with knock on implications for the real economy.

While the build-up of credit in the Irish circumstance has been somewhat extreme, the

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61982 is the earliest date that data for PSC is available.
last 10 years has seen many European countries also experience significant increases. Figure 4 plots the degree of financial deepening for a sample of European countries from 1999 to the present. What is evident is the emergence of two clubs for this sample of countries. On the left hand side of the figure, the ratio is plotted for Ireland, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, while the remaining seven countries (Germany, France, Italy, Finland, Greece, Belgium and Austria) are plotted on the right. For the former set of countries, the ratio of private sector credit to GDP is around 200 per cent by 2010. This follows a period of sustained growth in the ratio, mainly from about 2003 onwards. While some countries in the latter category also experience growth, most of these countries have a ratio of approximately 100 per cent by 2010.

4.1 Structural break analysis

Earlier sections outline the shortcoming of basing new counter-cyclical capital requirements on HP filter techniques and argue targeting a steady state level would be more efficient. The problem is determining periods when the PSC/GDP ratio is at steady state level and periods of deviation. In a formal, statistical manner, the possibility of multiple states in a relationship can be explored using a Markov Switching framework.

A regime-switching model combines two or more sets of parameters into one system and also the likelihood of each regime at a given time. We define a two state Markov-switching model which allows for different means in the growth rate of PSC/GDP, taking the form,

\[
\left( \frac{PSC}{GDP} \right)_t = \begin{cases} 
\alpha_1 & s(t) = 1 \\
\alpha_2 & s(t) = 2 
\end{cases}
\]

where \(s(t)\) denotes the state the economy is in at time \(t\). \(s(t)\) is determined by a Markov chain which itself depends on a transition matrix. The transition matrix gathers the probabilities that one particular state is followed by another particular state. These transition probabilities are assumed to be time stationary.

\(^7\)The regime classification measure (RCM) of Ang and Bekaert (2002) indicates that both regimes are clearly defined.
Table 3 shows the growth rate of the PSC/GDP ratio moves discretely between two regimes; one characterised by a stable ratio oscillating around zero growth (state 1) and another defined as highly positive and more volatile (state 2). In fact, estimates show annualised quarterly growth of more than 12 per cent for state 2. This results in a credit boom any time the economy is in state 2. The model is well defined as the transition probabilities show the level of persistence in each regime is quite high indicating that when the economy is in a particular regime in one period, it is highly likely to remain in that state in the next time period.

Figure 6 presents the time series dimension, showing a high and consistent probability of being in state 1 for the period 1983-1997. The model then estimates a switch, with PSC outpacing GDP until 2001 when a US recession stifled the Irish credit boom. In 2003, another switch occurs with PSC again outpacing GDP until the financial crisis of 2007/2008. This provides solid justification for estimating the steady-state relationship over the period 1983-1997.

4.2 Empirical model

The results from the Markov switching regime approach are used to motivate the econometric analysis. In particular, these results suggest the presence of a clear structural break in the PSC to GDP relationship around 1998. In Table 3 we present the results of Granger causality tests for the period 1983 to 1997. Standard F-Tests would suggest that, in the long-run, credit appears to be a determinant of both itself and GDP, while GDP would only appear to be a determinant of itself. This is not an altogether surprising result given the manner in which credit was regulated in the Irish economy.

Based on this, we run a series of long-run regressions with GDP as the dependent variable and PSC as the regressor. Given the results from the structural break analysis, we conduct the estimation over the entire (1982 - 2010) period and over the sub-period 1982 - 1997. The results are summarised in Table 4.

In the interests of robustness, we use two long-run estimators. Along with OLS estimates, we also use the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) methodology of Stock and Watson (1993). The DOLS estimator falls under the single-equation Engle Granger (Engle
and Granger (1987)) approach to cointegration while allowing for endogeneity within the specified long-run relationships. Single equation approaches have been used in other models of the housing market, such as Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007), McQuinn and O’Reilly (2007) and McQuinn and O’Reilly (2008).

The Stock and Watson (1993) DOLS approach explicitly allows for potential correlation between explanatory variables and the error process. It involves adding both leads and lags of the differenced regressors to the hypothesised long-run specification to correct for correlation between the error process.\(^8\) In our application, the error term is assumed to follow an AR(2) process, while the number of leads and lags is set equal to 2.\(^9\)

The results clearly demonstrate a significant relationship between the variables. With both OLS and DOLS, the private sector variable is highly significant. Clearly, over the period 1982 - 1997, the coefficient on the PSC variable is somewhat greater than what it is when estimated over the entire period. As GDP doesn’t grow at the same rate as PSC after 1998, the size of the coefficient on the PSC variable is, consequently, smaller for this period. Figure 4 plots the OLS residuals from the regression over the two sample periods. In comparison with the residuals estimated over the entire sample period, those estimated over the period 1982 - 1997 appear to be well-behaved and stationary.

### 4.3 Counterfactual scenario

Based on the long-run model estimated for GDP over the period 1983 - 1997, we also estimate the equivalent short-run model for both GDP and private-sector credit. For the error-correction term, we use the residuals from the OLS regression of GDP on PSC. The results are summarised in Table 5 and it is evident, in the case of GDP, that the error correction term is negative and significant. Both short-term models have relatively high

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\(^8\)The error term is liable to be serially correlated so the covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients must be adjusted accordingly. This involves modifying the covariance matrix of the original regressors by specifying and estimating an AR(p) model for the error term. See Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007) for more on this.

\(^9\)We experimented with alternative values of \(k\) and length of the AR() process, however, our results were not significantly changed. Parameter estimates for the leads and lags in the DOLS estimation are available, upon request, from the authors.
We then use the short-run model for GDP to perform a counterfactual simulation. The question we ask is what would have happened to Irish GDP, post 1997, if credit in the economy had grown at the European average? In conducting the simulation, we use the results for the error correction model presented in Table 5. Thus, given the moderate rate of credit growth assumed under the simulation, we are also assuming that the economy responds in a steady-state like manner to this growth. In Figure 6 we contrast the actual rate of credit growth with the average across the countries in Figure 5. In Figure 7 we then plot the actual level of GDP with the simulated level from the short-run model. The percentage difference between the two levels is also plotted. By 2007, it is evident that actual GDP in the Irish economy, was over 20 per cent higher than what would have prevailed if a more normal rate of credit growth had been experienced. One issue which does emerge from the simulation is that by 2010, the Irish economy would appear to have over corrected in terms of the long-run relationship between credit and GDP i.e. GDP has fallen below the level suggested by a more equilibrium level of credit within the economy.

Thus, going forward, these results would suggest two countervailing implications for Irish growth. The deleveraging process suggested by the large funding gap in Figure 3 would likely cause a drag on economic growth as credit levels are set to contract in the real economy. However the overcorrection, which appears to have occurred already, could cause growth rates to accelerate in the short to medium term.

This contractionary impact of private-sector credit on GDP has recently been the focus of some interest. In a cross-country context, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) examine whether the significant build up in the ratio of credit to GDP prior to 2007 impacted negatively on the growth rate of GDP post 2008. Connor and O’Kelly (2010), in a counter-factual exercise, estimate the effect on Irish GDP between 2003 and 2008 if a stricter financial system regulatory regime had been in place during this period. The greater regulatory controls are simulated through lower levels of private-sector credit levels due to reduced activity levels in the Irish residential and commercial property market.
5 Conclusions

A wealth of literature now links rapid credit growth with financial crises. Empirically, this has prompted a number of attempts to exploit data on credit growth to build early warning indicators of financial crises. From a policy perspective, the most recent example of this has been the proposed countercyclical capital buffer proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The proposal is to calibrate this buffer based on the deviation from trend (as calculated using a HP filter) of the PSC/GDP ratio.

We examine the use of such an approach in an Irish context. Even by international standards, post-2003, the accumulation of credit in the Irish economy has been considerable. The most obvious manifestation of this credit boom was through the residential housing market, where increases in Irish house prices were the largest over the last 10 years across OECD countries.

In examining the Basel proposal, the paper makes two contributions. First, it provides an alternative to the HP filter trending techniques by using a Markov switching framework. This determines periods of stability in the PSC to GDP ratio, thus allowing one to estimate the steady state relationship. A capital buffer to prevent excess credit can be based on deviations from this estimate. This would seem to be particularly warranted where a country experienced a rapid build up of credit. While Irish credit growth increased markedly over the past 10 years, it is worth noting that other European countries also experienced significant increases. Indeed the paper notes the emergence of a “twin club” development across Europe in that regard. Thus, we feel the notion of alternative states in the PSC to GDP ratio needs to be allowed for in applying the Basel proposal across countries.

Additionally, the paper highlights the uncertain path of future Irish macroeconomic growth given the inevitable deleveraging process, which is set to occur in the Irish banking sector. The accumulation of credit lead to a sizeable funding gap, which will almost certainly have to contract in the medium term. In the absence of policies tailored to deal with this, it is difficult to envisage how this contraction will not negatively impact on future Irish growth.
References


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<td>Average Mortgage Issued</td>
<td>euros</td>
<td>28,192</td>
<td>54,094</td>
<td>111,355</td>
<td>231,206</td>
<td>271,154</td>
<td>230,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Mortgages Issued</td>
<td></td>
<td>31,203</td>
<td>49,288</td>
<td>80,856</td>
<td>120,037</td>
<td>88,747</td>
<td>27,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Prices</td>
<td>euros</td>
<td>46,542</td>
<td>77,994</td>
<td>169,191</td>
<td>276,221</td>
<td>322,634</td>
<td>242,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Supply</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,948</td>
<td>30,575</td>
<td>49,812</td>
<td>80,957</td>
<td>78,027</td>
<td>27,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Credit (PSC)</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Deepening</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>171.4</td>
<td>219.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Gap</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The figures for GDP and PSC are real annualised growth rates, while the rest of the variables are actual rates.
Table 3: Estimates from Markov Switching Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>Non-Switching</td>
<td>5.875 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_1$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3244 (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.335 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expected Duration (time periods)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>29.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: P-values are in parenthesis.

The transition probabilities matrix is given by,

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
0.97 & 0.03 \\
0.07 & 0.93 \\
(0.00) & (0.17) \\
(0.17) & (0.00)
\end{pmatrix}
\]
Table 4: Granger causality tests in levels: 1983:1 - 1997:4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>F-Stat</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>psc</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdp</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>F-Stat</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>psc</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdp</td>
<td>16.53</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Long Run Estimates of Irish GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>DOLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982:4 - 2010:1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>psc</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>0.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982:4 - 1997:4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>psc</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cointegration test

6.3

Structural break test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Break-Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bai-Perron</td>
<td>1997:03 2006:01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The cointegration test refers to the Engle-Granger (1987) test and the statistic is the t-stat on the lagged residual term from the long-run regression run over the 1982:4 - 1997:4 time period.
Table 6: Short-Run Estimates of GDP and PSC 1983:1-1997:4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>△gdp_t</th>
<th>△psc_t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECT_{t-1}</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.37)</td>
<td>(3.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>△gdp_t</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>△gdp_{t-1}</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-5.96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>△psc_t</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>△psc_{t-4}</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.78)</td>
<td>(3.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\bar{R}^2</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** ECT = error correction term, t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Figure 1
Gap between the Realised and Trend Irish PSC/GDP Ratio using HP Filter
for a Selection of Lamda Values
Figure 2
Annual Real Irish GDP and PSC Growth 1983–2010
Figure 3
Figure 4
Private Sector Credit and Deposit Levels in the Irish Banking System (1983–2010)
Figure 5
Select European Countries Levels of Financial Deepening (1999−2010)

Relatively High Levels of Financial Deepening

Relatively Low Levels of Financial Deepening


80  100  120  140  160  180  200  220  240  260

40  50  60  70  80  90  100  110  120  130  140

UK  ES  IRL  NL  POT  FR  ITA  AUT  FI  GER  BEL
Figure 6
State Probabilities for the Change in Mean of the Ratio PSC/GDP in Ireland 1982–2010
Figure 7
Residuals from GDP on Private Sector Credit

Sample (1983–2010)
Sample (1983–1997)
Figure 8
Scenario Results for Counterfactual Private Sector Credit

GDP Actual and Scenario

Percentage Difference between Actual and Scenario GDP